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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigated the potential effect of market failures in labor and capital markets in 
addition to market failure due to high transaction costs on the transitional path to trade 
liberalization. All three types of market failure were found to reduce the speed of adjustment to free 
trade and contribute to high adjustment costs. The paper also examined the consistency of the 
macroeconomic environment with the objectives of trade liberalization. It is postulated that a 
macroeconomic environment that is basically recessionary is likely to lead to high adjustment costs.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ree trade, a policy stance that is hardly new dating back to the classical economists has been 
traditionally advocated mainly on the basis of the conventional static gains from trade - those arising 
from a more efficient reallocation of resources - and owes its more recent revival to what has come to 
be known as the dynamic gains from trade - those arising from the reallocation of investment resources or in response 
to increasing productivity as emphasized in the new growth theories. However, while the theoretical evidence seem 
most compelling, moving from the realm of theory to practical implementation raises a number of concerns 
particularly for countries that have adopted inward oriented strategies – and Egypt is no exception- over a relatively 
long period of time coupled with heavy reliance on tariff and non tariff barriers for the purpose of promoting an 
indigenous industrial sector. These concerns are basically related to the problems and costs of adjustment to trade 
liberalization.  
 
The few qualitative studies addressing problems of adjustment - most of which dates back to the early 
seventies -   hypothesized that imperfections in labor, capital and product markets are the main factors contributing to 
high adjustment costs to trade liberalization. A leading World Bank empirical study (Michaely et al, 1991) revealed 
that the transitional costs of adjustment to trade liberalization are usually manifested in rising unemployment rates, 
balance of payment problems and declining industrial output. Meanwhile, the magnitude of these costs depends on the 
nature of the economic environment - existing market arrangements, the institutional setting, macroeconomic policies 
etc. - within which trade liberalization is implemented.  
 
In particular,  empirical evidence reveals that the success of many trade liberalization attempts have hinged 
on the ability of efficient import substituting and expanding export industries to quickly absorb the resources released 
from declining industries. This minimizes pressure on the balance of payment and reduces the incidence of transitional 
unemployment. The World Bank study confirms that these are two of the main factors underlying the failure or at 
least the partial reversal of many trade liberalization attempts. (Michaely et al, 1991). The speed of adjustment is the 
critical element in this analysis. Naturally, the speed of adjustment will be influenced by the economic environment 
within which trade liberalization takes place.  
 
In light of these considerations, some of the broad characteristics of the economic environment for the 
Egyptian economy will be analyzed in this paper. Whether markets work well or not, is a question of central 
importance. To the traditional types of market failures acknowledged in the literature, this paper adds the class of 
market failures arising from high transaction costs as a possible factor influencing adjustment. The focus ,in general, 
will be on identifying the constraints -if any- that might impede the efficient adjustment to trade liberalization and 
assessing the degree of consistency of the macroeconomic environment with the objectives of trade liberalization.  
F 
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The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. How market failures influence adjustment is taken up in section 
one. In section two the state of the working of markets in Egypt will be examined. Macroeconomic policies will be  
analyzed in section three. Finally, section four presents the conclusion and policy implications.  
 
SECTION I 
 
Since the inception of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947, reducing trade barriers 
became the  top priority goal of the major industrialized countries. Successive rounds of negotiation over the span of 
almost half a century achieved little towards the complete elimination of these barriers.  In anticipation of high 
adjustment costs, many countries developed or underdeveloped alike, either chose to abandon the whole idea of free 
trade, were slow to introduce trade reform or quickly opted for policy reversals as soon as problems of adjustment 
loomed ahead.  The recurrence or persistence of problems of this kind suggests that more research is certainly needed 
to identify the factors underlying this phenomenon along with the appropriate adjustment policies before it becomes 
too optimistic to quest for a free world trading system.   
 
The task of identifying the factors that lead to adjustment problems becomes relatively straight forward if it is 
possible to sketch the details of an ideal economic environment, one that facilitates the release of resources from lower 
to higher productive use and therefore minimize on the adjustment costs to trade liberalization. Deviations from this 
ideal environment points to the respective factors and provides grounds to anticipate adjustment problems exante. In 
other words, the factors responsible for these deviations are the very same ones that lead to adjustment problems. The 
larger are these deviations, the larger will be the magnitude of adjustment costs. Details of micro and macro nature are 
both relevant. Discussion of the macroeconomic details will be deferred to the section on the Egyptian economy. This 
is partly because they have been emphasized elsewhere (Michaely et al , 1991) and partly because it will be more 
illuminating to illustrate their importance with an actual case study. Below, the emphasis will be on some 
microeconomic details. Allowing for a more general exposition allows in turn for broader generalizations to the 
experience of other countries. Hence a separate section was necessary.  
 
Adjustment To Trade Liberalization: Microeconomic Conditions 
 
 It is beyond dispute that under conditions of perfect competition and perfect foresight, market forces will 
always provide the most efficient adjustment mechanism through signals embedded in changing relative prices and 
job opportunities. The reallocation of resources - under these conditions - will be frictionless and instantaneous (Bank 
and Tumlir, 1986) precisely because markets are presumed to work well. There are no barriers to entry and exit, prices 
are sufficiently flexible, information is perfect, externalities are absent and the cost of market contracting is zero. Even 
the most basic of institutions e.g. firms, money, public regulations etc become irrelevant in this setting basically 
because the optimality of the perfectly competitive system rests in part on the assumption that institutions do not play 
any role in the determination of equilibrium prices. (Furubotn and Richer, 1991) 
 
In this environment, firms will contract or exit if losses are incurred while more efficient firms will expand 
and new entry will occur as profitable opportunities persist or widens. Losses can be merely incurred due to 
unfortunate circumstances or can simply reflect the release of resources into more profitable uses. The rate of exit or 
decline which thus occurs independently of economic conditions prevailing (like a recession) can be defined as the 
natural rate of decline. The reallocation of resources will be frictionless and instantaneous, but will nonetheless 
involve costs that are inevitable and are to a large extent part of the working of the market economy where success is 
rewarded and failure penalized. (ECC, 1988) 
 
Recognizing  the limitations of this ideal economic environment,  which being neoclassical in spirit abstracts 
from many of the realities of the economic system, particularly from institutional structure, - a factor that is known to 
influence both incentives and behavior - (Furubotn and Richer, 1991) provides the starting point in the analysis of 
adjustment problems to trade liberalization. In reality, markets can and do fail and institutions influence incentives and 
behavior all of which will have profound implications for, the speed of adjustment, the properties of the adjustment 
path to trade liberalization and the magnitude of adjustment costs. 
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The main point is that as we move to environments where markets are imperfect (labor, capital and product 
markets) uncertainty and risk increases and prices loose much of their informational content (Bank and Tumlir, 1986) 
creating distortions to the adjustment process. Problems of adjustment typically occur when distortions and 
presumably the lack of perfect foresight, create divergence between the private and social perceptions of the costs and 
benefits of adjustment, preventing -in turn- the optimal allocation of resources. In this case, not only will the 
adjustment process be less than instantaneous, but instantaneous adjustment might not be the socially optimal policy. 
(Mussa, 1982) 
 
Many of the factors that impede the working of the market mechanism are institutional in nature.  Allowing 
for more institutional detail in the analysis is essential to understanding problems of adjustment in general. Relaxing 
the assumption of zero cost of market contracting is considered a potentially powerful factor that contributes to the 
deviation of the social benefits and costs of adjustment from the private costs and benefits. Considering this category 
of market failures provides more scope to analyze and emphasize the influence of the institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements on the path of adjustment to trade liberalization. We will begin the discussion by the more 
traditional types of failure in factor markets. 
 
Labor Market Failures 
 
Sources of market failures in labor markets are numerous, ranging from the asymmetry of information about 
the future pattern of comparative advantage, externalities in the accumulation of human capital - which is usually 
responsible for under investment by both employer and employees in firm specific skills - to congestion problems that 
increases the costs of search by workers. (Trebilcock et al, 1990) 
 
A number of institutional factors can further inhibit the efficient working of the labor market. On the demand 
side, these include wage rigidities due to wage indexation or pressure from labor unions in addition to social security 
regulations which constraint the ability of firms to alter the size of their labor force especially where adjustment 
entails downsizing. Other restrictive practices include cumbersome administrative dismissal (and hiring) procedures 
which usually provides wide scope for government intervention. (Banks and Tumlir, 1986). Market failures also arise 
when pensions deter firms from hiring elderly workers (Wonnacott and Hill, 1987). On the supply side, a number of 
studies have confirmed that unemployment insurance (especially for unskilled workers) and the subsidization of 
housing costs in certain regions can reduce the incentives for dislocated workers to seek reemployment in regions 
other than their home ones. (Banks and Tumlir, 1986) 
 
Capital Market Failures 
 
Inadequate collateral or credit rationing are among the leading causes of market failures in capital markets. 
This implies that some borrowers will be rationed out of the capital market constraining their ability to finance 
investment for expansion or restructuring.  The credit constraint is likely to be even more binding for labor where 
funds are needed to cover the costs of retraining or reallocation. (Wonnacott and Hill, 1987).  
 
Like wise the case with labor markets, several institutional factors contribute to imperfections in capital 
market.  Complex systems of taxation renders the process of ranking alternative investment opportunities according to 
private and social profitability intrinsically difficult. In environments characterized by excessive inflationary 
pressures, a tax system where depreciation allowances are based on historical values of the capital stock reduces the 
after tax profitability of investment and tilts it in favor of short term projects. Investment demand can be also curtailed 
when regulations that restrict market entry encourage collusive behavior on behalf of lending institutions and 
consequently lead to high interest rates. Low administered interest rates reduce the volume of savings and thus 
available finance. The cumulative effect of these policies tends to reduce the sources of mobility in the capital stock, 
both the outflow (depreciation) and the inflow (new investment). (Banks and Tumlir, 1986) 
 
Market failures in both labor and capital markets essentially reduces the mobility of factors of production. 
When the mobility of factors of production is reduced, adjustment to changing economic circumstances - at least in 
the short run - can lead to excessive costs. These costs arise in the form of disallocation cost measured by the amount 
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of output sacrificed as labor and capital released from declining activities remain idle and in the form of adjustment 
costs measured in terms of the resources sacrificed to retrain labor, reorganize production operations and reorient the 
capital stock within the same firm, intra-sectorally or intersectorally (Richardson, 1980). 
 
Market Failures due to Transaction Costs 
 
Analyzing adjustment problems under conditions of market failures of the variety discussed above has been 
the main occupation of the literature addressing problems of adjustment to trade liberalization. Market failures in labor 
and capital markets - which mainly arise as a result of price rigidities - were the prime factors impeding instantaneous 
and frictionless adjustment.  Not withstanding the significant contribution towards understanding problems of 
adjustment, and although institutional factors were found to be responsible in many cases for imperfections in both 
labor and capital markets, the literature suffers from several caveats. Because the literature deals mostly with 
developed countries, the institutions of which are in general sound, the way in which institutions influence the path of 
adjustment did not receive adequate attention. In particular, one class of market failures those that arise -on lines of 
transaction cost theory- due to high transaction costs have been virtually neglected.  
 
The main idea underlying the theory of transaction costs is that under the assumptions of asset specificity, 
bounded rationality and opportunism, the perfectly competitive model is no longer a realistic representation of the 
economic environment within which trade liberalization will take place. It is no longer realistic either to assume 
perfect foresight. The competitive model must essentially be replaced by the governance model which renders 
deviations from the neoclassical ideal referred to earlier more pronounced.  Adjustment within the framework of these 
imperfect market alternatives is neither instantaneous nor frictionless. (See Williamson, 1985, Klein et al, 1978, 
Crocker and Masten, 1991). According to the theory of transaction cost, institutions influence equilibrium prices. In 
many respects prices are expected to deviate from competitive prices. For example, firms charge prices that are higher 
than competitive levels to safeguard investment in specific assets. (Williamson, 1985) which can contribute to costly 
misallocation of resource. (Klein, 1984) 
 
The main point is that the more important asset specificity is , the more important the share of an economy‟s 
activity that is characterized by sunk cost – which acts as a strong barrier to exit and thus  entry- and thus  the slower 
the speed of adjustment and the higher is the cost of adjustment. In particular the process of transferring released 
specific resources from inefficient to efficient activities will be hindered and consequently released resources are 
likely to stay idle. It follows that instantaneous and frictionless adjustment to free trade is not possible. The cost of 
adjustment will be higher the larger is the share of an economy‟s activity that is characterized by sunk cost. 
 
SECTION II 
 
The analysis conducted in section one proves that an economic environment characterized be well 
functioning markets and well developed institutions is an important prerequisite for the efficiency and sustainability of 
the adjustment path to trade liberalization. As Egypt moves further towards integrating its economy in world markets, 
further reduction in tariff rates are expected to take place, it is thus necessary to examine the nature of the economic 
environment and how it conforms with or deviates from the ideal model sketched in the preceding section. The 
pertinent question is whether markets work well or not. It is also necessary to examine the extent to which the 
macroeconomic environment is consistent with the objectives of trade liberalization. The First question is taken up in 
this section.  
 
Egypt‟s experience with free markets is quite new. Before 1974, and for roughly a decade and a half, an 
economic system based on central planning prevailed. During this period, a massive wave of nationalization of 
domestic and foreign private enterprises laid the ground for the creation and growth of a large public sector. Prices of 
numerous products in addition to key macroeconomic variables like interest rates and exchange rates were 
administratively set. A program of guaranteed employment for university graduates by the government and a policy of 
credit rationing implied that labor and capital resources were largely administratively allocated.  
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With the initiation of the Open Door Policy in 1974, a development strategy based on free markets was 
instituted. Although the Open Door Policy clearly assigned the leading role in the development process for the private 
sector, the public sector nonetheless continued to play the dominant role.  Moreover, prices as well as resource 
allocation remained to be administratively determined through out 1974-1986. This policy was gradually abandoned 
under Egypt‟s structural adjustment program which was implemented following the slowing down of economic 
growth starting the eighties and the rising foreign indebtness.  
 
However, lacking dynamism is considered one of the striking features of domestic markets in Egypt. One 
main reason for lacking dynamism is the presence of barriers to entry and exit.  
 
Barriers To Entry And Exit 
 
Investment regime 
 
Two main aspects of the investment regime act as strong barrier to entry. The first is the excessively high 
capitalization requirements, especially deterrent of small enterprises. (Goans, J. 2002). The second is related to local 
content requirement. In 1997, Law 8 which granted foreign investment - for the first time - national treatment was 
introduced. Although local content requirement has been abolished in accordance with the Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIM) agreement, to qualify for custom exemptions, local content requirements are set as high as 60% for 
some industries (United Nations, 1999). 
  
Imperfect Labor Markets 
 
A number of legal, regulatory and institutional factors that act as strong barriers to entry and exit. Among the 
most important of these barriers are those imposed by Labor laws.  
 
Until the initiation of law 12 in 2003, the principal labor  law governing employer/employee relationship in 
Egypt was Law 137 of 1981. According to this law the hiring or dismissal of employees under permanent contracts by 
firm must take place through the Ministry of Man power. For this same category of employees, the firm must abide by 
social security laws.  Dismissal is subject to very stringent and  cumbersome administrative procedures.  Only upon 
the approval of a stoppage committee formed by a Ministerial decree,  are firms allowed to alter their labor force. 
Contractual obligations of the firms remain in effect even under conditions of liquidation or bankruptcy ( in the latter 
case as long court as appointed trustees are able to run the firm contractual obligations remain binding and only when 
the court approves asset liquidation of a bankrupt firm can  employment contracts be terminated)  until the stoppage 
committee finalize it‟s decision. Again only for reasons completely outside the control of employers (natural disasters, 
wars, etc.) are final closures and thus termination of contracts- becomes possible. Finally, minimum wage legislation 
exist varying by industry, occupation and region and they are frequently adjusted for the cost of living. (Assad, 1993) 
 
Law 137 of 1981 has had quite a different impact on private versus public sector and formal private versus 
informal private sector. Establishments belonging to the  informal private sector which accounts for 30% of total 
employment outside agriculture  (establishments with less than ten employees), are generally not required to abide by 
the labor law. For the formal private sector, hiring on the basis of temporary contracts was the most commonly used 
method for circumventing this law whereby only 15-20% of formal private sector outside agriculture are covered by 
permanent contracts.  In contrast there is  no scope to circumvent the labor law in the case of the public sector where 
employment -except for construction- takes place only under permanent contracts. While employment under 
temporary contracts have reduced incentives for private firms to invest in training for  sector specific skills, permanent 
employment contacts for the public sector have reduced its ability to adjust the size of its labor force in the face of 
changing economic conditions.  (Assad, 1993). Meanwhile, introducing new technology to restore competitiveness is 
obstructed due to costly dismissal procedures. Labor regulations has been also responsible for the increasing capital 
intensity in the private sector. (Fawzy, 1999).  
 
A number of health, environmental and safety regulations are also imposed by the labor law. The cost of 
abiding by the law for larger firms increases further  if one takes into account  the cost of training  employees which as 
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mentioned above many firms are hesitant to undertake since the   possibility that  these trained employees would  
leave the firm remains open) given that  support services for technical, vocational and administrative training is 
lacking for Egypt‟s Labor force, half of which is illiterate.  All the above factors, particularly those pertaining to labor 
law contributes to the existence of large sunk costs that impedes both the entry and exit of firms . In general, this has 
rendered markets in Egypt noncontestable and comprised a form of protection enjoyed by existing firms as opposed to 
new entrants. (World Bank, 1994).  
 
The new labor law, law 12 of 2003, have greatly simplified  dismissal and hiring procedures but does not 
apply in retrospect, i.e. applies only to permanent contracts concluded after 2003.  
 
Merger and Bankruptcy  
 
Several other factors act as barriers to efficient exit. These include as discussed above labor regulations in 
addition to a legally complex merger and bankruptcy procedures. For example, the  firm cannot take a decision -sell, 
merge, and change  the  product mix- which  might involve changing   the size of its labor force without the  approval 
of the stoppage committee. (World Bank, 1992). 
 
The bankruptcy law2 is too strict in terms of the sanctions imposed in the wake of insolvency. For example, 
debtors will be expelled from the commercial register, are deprived from the right to do business or occupy certain 
jobs.  “Debt discharge” is not allowed even after liquidation and creditors receive their share of liquidated assets. 
Rehabilitation is not possible unless debt is repaid or after three years from the ending date of bankruptcy. For these 
reasons, debtors will avoid or delay adjudication as bankrupt, retard the process of administration of assets that 
follows bankruptcy or avoid exiting in general. (Nathan Associates, 1998).  
 
Some provisions - like partial discharge of debt - necessary for allowing  debtors  to continue in business and 
reorganize or restructure the firm while under the protection of the bankruptcy court are absent from the law. 
Troubled, but potentially viable firms are thus forced to  exit. Lengthy, complicated and costly liquidation procedures 
due to the lack of special bankruptcy rules as well as specialized courts prevents the prompt reallocation of both 
physical and labor assets of an inefficient bankrupt firms to higher uses. As such, the bankruptcy law discourages 
entrepreneurship by increasing the risks associated with doing business, acts as a strong barrier to - exit and in turn 
entry - and retards the efficient reallocation of resources. (Nathan Associates, 1998).  
 
In order to understand the impact of such impediments on adjustment it is useful to examine how they have 
affected the private sector so far. Both the investment regime and the regulatory framework within which the private 
sector was - and still is-  operating had important repercussions  not only on the type of activities favored by the 
private sector but also on  the size structure of establishments. The private sector in Egypt is dominated by small scale 
enterprises (firms with less than ten employees) which  accounted for 98.3% of establishments of the private sector 
and accounted for 77.3% of the total employment in 1996. (Handoussa, 2002). Its early flourish goes back to the 1960 
where small size informal private enterprises were the only means of  survival during an era of nationalization and 
central planning. With the liberalization of 1975 several factors have helped reinforce this structure: (World Bank, 
1994) 
 
First: The investment incentive package introduced was primarily designed to benefit medium to large scale projects. 
For example, licensing approval -before 1991-  was contingent on the use of serviced land located in new urban cities 
where  full ownership is first set on probational basis and is denied if the project is not set within three years. In the 
outset,  this has meant that land cannot be used as collateral. Moreover, the cost of registration fees for land is very 
high equal to 12% of   its assessed value. (Law 6/1991 gave a temporary 50% reduction in those fees for land 
registered through 1994). These high fees are sizable costs to cash constraint small scale enterprises.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Egypt is currently drafting a new bankruptcy law 
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Second, the private sector regulatory framework has  inhibited the growth of small scale enterprises to medium or 
larger scale. To mention but a few, the high cost of abiding by the regulations imposed by labor laws can only be 
avoided by small size.  
 
Third: Again because of the weak state of the judicial system, banks over collaterize to secure their debt and thus most 
of bank lending is directed towards medium to large enterprises and is mainly of short run maturity (five years).  
 
Fourth: A very restrictive legal framework for securitization impairs the ability of firms in general and small scale 
enterprises and new firms - that lack any credit history - in particular to mobilize lending. 
 
 Barriers to exit and entry is one important factor responsible for the lacking competition in domestic markets. 
The effect of lacking competition was reflected in the high prices and poor quality of most goods and services 
produced in Egypt. One area where this evident in the services sector (Financial intermediation, insurance, business 
services, telecommunications, transportation etc.) For firms, the cost of the poor quality of services corresponds to an 
implicit tax estimated to be equivalent to 15% tariff. Because of the importance of services inputs in a wide range of 
industrial activity, this implicit tax has substantially reduced the effective protection they enjoyed. (Hoekman, 1997).  
 
Barriers to exit,  entry or alter size  reduces  the degree of “dynamism” in the economy. (ECC, 1988).  Firms 
that are small in size are unable to and do not have any incentive to expand which implies that  markets provide little 
if no scope to benefit from economies of scale, while firms that have to downsize  in order to be able to compete or 
restructure  are constrained from doing so.   Low dynamism ultimately reduces the speed of adjustment of the 
economy in response to  changing  economic conditions and impedes the release of resources out of inefficient 
activities to higher uses.  
 
Market Failures Due To Transaction Costs 
 
Adjustment problems will be further accentuated due to the condition of asset specificity which serves as an 
important barrier to exit and entry and a leading cause of market failures as highlighted in section one. This is true to 
the extent that the share of the economy‟s activities that is characterized by sunk costs is large and to the extent that 
other aspects of the regulatory and institutional environment impose high  transaction costs on those who engage in 
economic activity.  
 
To begin with, it must be noted that court jurisdiction in Egypt is extremely inefficaeous and  business 
surveys have proved that its is one of the most binding constraints facing private investors. Resolving disputes is very 
costly in terms of time and resources. It usually takes around four years on average to settle disputes compared to one 
year outside courts. Contract and law enforcement in general is very weak. Expropriation risk is  high. The current 
legislation - inherited from the central planning era - which is also more suited to a closed economy is deemed 
incompatible with an opened  market economy. (Fawzy, 1999). Transaction costs arise because laws are complex, 
procedural requirements are enormous and the system itself rests fundamentally on the premise that the government is 
responsible for assuring “propriety” of any action. In general, such characteristics have only served reinforce 
government control over business activity (Goans, 2002) and  thwart the forces of competition.  Property rights are not 
well defined. Some of the articles in the constitution asserting collective ownership of means of production continue 
to exist. (Hillal, 2002). Although Egypt is a signatory to the main international patents, trademarks and copyrights 
convention, violation of copyright laws especially in the areas of video and audiocassette and disks, medical textbooks 
and computer software is considered a major problem for business involved in these activities. As a result Egypt has 
been on the United States „watch list‟ and „priority watch list‟ which pertains to countries that does not provide 
adequate intellectual property protection according to Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1988. The 
problem is less severe in cases of protection of trademarks and industrial designs and models but  law enforcement is 
rather weak as courts have little experience in dealing with infringement cases. The lack of supporting  infrastructure 
and the weakness of the judicial system acts as a strong barrier to investment in research and development and inhibits 
innovation. It is not surprising then  that expenditure on research and development by both private and public sectors 
in Egypt is below the benchmark 1% of GDP set for developing countries. (United Nations, 1999). 
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The environment is highly uncertain, a feature that  is ranked by investors as anther important binding 
constraint to doing business in Egypt. Inconsistent policies are frequently initiated. Policy reversal is very common 
since there are no national (law, constitution) or international restraints (foreign aid that is tied to economic rather than 
political conditions., strong commitment under the GATT/WTO etc.,) to prevent such reversals. (Galal, 1996).  
 
The institutional environment exemplifies most of the features that discourages investment in specific assets; 
high uncertainty, weak property right and law enforcement in addition to a letter of law that is too strict (labor law, 
bankruptcy law) (Williamson, 1991) all of which could be taken as  indications that asset specificity is not so 
important in the Egyptian economy. While there is preliminary crude evidence that in the  case of the private sector 
both human and physical asset specificity is not significant given the small informal nature of establishments, it is not 
clear whether this is true in the case of the public sector which continues to account for the major share of economic 
activity.  However, even if asset specificity is not significant, by its very nature,  public ownership implies that the 
high powered incentives of the market are totally suppressed, a major factor that reduces the speed of adjustment to 
free trade. Meanwhile, and as mentioned earlier, an institutional environment with the above  undesirable 
characteristics rules out revitalization as a viable adjustment strategy whenever it is necessary to invest in specific 
asset.   
 
Several other aspects of the institutional and regulatory environment are responsible for high transaction 
costs.  To mention but a few, firms incur transaction costs from the very first minute a decision is made to enter the 
business to the very last minute until - if conditions dictate so - it exits the market. During the course of its activities, 
transaction costs are incurred as tax obligations are met,  as inputs that cannot be procured domestically are imported 
and as part or all of its output is exported.  
 
Forming a new enterprise is subject to lengthy and costly procedural requirements.  (Goans, 2002). Exiting 
involves considerable transaction costs primarily because those who are responsible for administering liquidation of a 
bankrupt firm receive fees that are deducted from the value of liquidated assets, the size of which increase as this 
process lasts longer, creating  strong incentives for costly delays and reducing the amount creditors can ultimately 
receive. (Nathan Associates, 1998).  
 
Problems arising in the implementation of tax laws are typical with most other laws. The perceptions of the 
business community is that even when the right laws are enacted there are usually problems with implementation and 
enforceability. For example, there is considerable lag between the enactment of laws and the issuing of executive 
decrees. This leads to ample room for discretion by the implementers and consequently lead to high transaction costs. 
Besides there is lack of qualified personnel for implementation. This causes problems especially when laws are vague 
or contradictory. (Ghoneim, 2002).  
 
Trading3 involves  substantial transaction costs mainly due to administrative red tape. Strikingly enough,  
administrative red tape have rendered the major incentive introduced to offset the antiexport bias of the trade regime - 
the temporary admission and drawback mechanism- ineffective.  Besides the limited scope of benefiting form these 
incentives in terms of eligibility  (when first introduced they were not extended to indirect exporters and remains to be 
granted only if the local content of the final product is 20% while non sale indirect taxes cannot be refunded)  they are 
characterized by administratively cumbersome procedures. The resulting  transaction cost along  with other forms of 
existing  administrative barriers to exporting  is estimated to account for 10-15% of the export price.  Importing 
activities share similar burdens. These include low quality/high cost port services - raising the CIF cost of imports by 
over 10% - and  cumbersome import clearance procedures equivalent to a tariff of 15%. (World Bank, 1997a).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Egypt is drafting a new custom law and the authorities are trying to simplify custom clearance procedures, but the outcome is still 
to be seen 
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Microeconomic Conditions: The Implications For Adjustment 
 
At this point, the answer to the question posed in the beginning of this section can now be safely asserted to 
be negative; given the above evidence markets in Egypt do not seem to work well. This is true for product (some 
goods are still subject to price controls) , labor and capital market. Market failures arise because of the presence of  
barriers to entry and exit,  price rigidities and high transaction costs, all of which provide grounds for anticipating high 
adjustment costs to trade liberalization. Whether the prevailing  macroeconomic conditions will provide more 
evidence in support of this last result is an issue that remains to be examined and will be undertaken in the next 
section.  
 
SECTION III: MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
In the analysis of the adjustment costs to trade liberalization, it is natural to expect that macroeconomic 
conditions influence the  adjustment path. After all, adjustment costs are ultimately manifested in falling output, rising 
unemployment and increasing pressure on the balance of payment all which are  macroeconomic variables.  
 
Besides favorable initial conditions on account of these three variables, macroeconomic conditions conducive 
to  minimum adjustment costs encompass all conditions or policies that promote economic growth. Only then can 
expanding efficient import substituting and export industries absorb resources released from inefficient activities, the 
incidence of transitional unemployment be reduced and pressure on the balance of payment be relieved. ( Michaely et 
al , 1991).  In what follows developments in some of the macroeconomic variables and policies that are important in 
this regard will be analyzed.  
 
Real Exchange Rate Appreciation  
 
An overvalued exchange rate is one of the main factors that contribute to a macroeconomic environment that 
is not favourable to low adjustment costs due to its important role in stimulating exports. Since the  exchange rate 
unification in 1991, Egypt has adopted a managed float regime with the nominal exchange rate  pegged to the U.S. 
dollar. To maintain a stable exchange rate, the authorities intervened  -on several occasions by buying dollars -which 
were mainly flowing as a result of revival of  Egypt‟s stock market-  Despite partial  sterilization, the resulting 
increase in the money supply fueled inflation which in turn translated into an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
against the dollar (Abdel Khalek, 1995) by roughly 33.05% between 1991-1997. Anthor factor responsible for real 
exchange rate appreciation vis a vis a basket of currencies of Egypt‟s major export competitors was an increase in the 
value of the dollar relative to other currencies. (Kheir ElDin and El Shawarby, 2002).  
 
Since 2001, Egypt has moved from a fixed exchange rate regime to a more flexible one in which periodic 
adjustment to the official rate will take place whenever market forces - as envisaged by the central bank - dictate so. ( 
Bennet, 2002) The nominal exchange rate has since then dropped  to 5.7 LE/$ in  2006. However, the phenomenon of 
real exchange rate appreciation continues to persist whereby the real exchange rate appreciated by approximately 49 
% against the US dollar over the interval 1999-2005.  Real exchange rate appreciation has been one of the main 
reasons behind the concentration of private investment -at least medium to large enterprises- in the nontradable sectors  
(World Bank,1997b) and continues to discourage production for exports. 
 
Monetary And Fiscal Policies 
 
One of the main goals of the reform efforts since mid eighties was achieving monetary and fiscal stringency 
in order to reduce the rate of inflation. Since then a  considerable decrease in the rate of growth of monetary 
aggregates took place. Annual rates of growth in the money supply M1 (excluding demand deposits in foreign 
currencies) declined from 7.21% in 1986 to (-4.03%) in 1991, showing positive and increasing rates of growth 
afterwards,  but declining to -6.71% by 2000 and further  to 5.6% in 2003. However, the rate of growth in the money 
supply increased to 121% in 2005.  The annual rate of growth in domestic credit decreased from 18.77% in 1986 to 
7.89% in 1991 increased to 13.3% in 2003 and declined to 4.2% in 2005.  Lending interest rates increased from 15 % 
in 1986 to 20.3% in 1992 decreased to 13.5 % in 2003 and witnessed no change since then. 
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The annual rate of growth of the money supply was curtailed as the budget deficit - and thus its  monetization 
- fell dramatically from  (-5,494) million LE in 1990 to a surplus of 1828 million LE in 1995. However, the budget 
deficit climbed to  (-9946)   million LE in 2003.  Meanwhile the rate of inflation (measured as percentage change in 
the consumer price index at 2000 prices) fell from 12% in 1993  to 4.2% in 2003, but increased to 28% 2005.   (It 
must be noted however that the rate of inflation depends on the nature of the basket of goods chosen to calculate index 
prices). Rising budget deficits and inflation will no doubt  jeopordize stability and thus shake investor‟s  confidence in 
the Egyptian economy when it is most needed.  
 
Aggregate Demand 
 
Aggregate demand including imports for goods and services ( in constant 2000 prices) exemplified  modest 
rates of growth through out much of the period 1999- 2005. These rates have varied between 7.42% to 8.63% 
respectively.  Wide spread excess capacity in the industrial sector signals insufficient demand as one of the main 
factors influencing capacity utilization. The annual rate of growth in exports of goods and services (in constant 2000 
prices) have declined from 35% in 2004 to 13% in 2005.  
 
Given that the bulk of merchandise exports consists of crude or refined petroleum it is difficult to foresee any 
revival of aggregate demand based on manufactured exports especially  since the bulk of Egypt‟s manufactured 
exports enjoy some form or another of preferential treatment (Generalized System of preferences) which will soon be 
eroded as a result of trade liberalization world wide. (Yeats, 1998).  On the other hand,  stringent rules of origin 
continues act as powerful constraint facing exports of manufactured goods under the association agreement between 
Egypt and its major trading partner the European Union.   
 
Current Account 
 
The situation on the current account  front is to a considerable degree favourable. Although the trade balance 
has been consistently in deficit since 1999,  Egypt has been running current account surplus since 2002. The current 
account surplus amounted to 3922 million dollars in 2005. However,  the overall balance of payment  registered a 
deficit of (584) million dollars, but is considerably lower than in  1999.  
 
Macroeconomic Conditions: The Implication For Adjustment 
 
The above figures provide clear evidence of a macroeconomic environment that is basically recessionary. 
Empirical analysis identifies a recessionary environment (weak domestic and external demand) as one of  the most 
important factors contributing to the presence of high adjustment costs to trade liberalization.  (Michaely et al , 1991) 
Under such circumstances it is hard to expect  that trade liberalization will have a significant impact on investment 
allocation and consequently on growth especially as the phenomenon of real exchange rate appreciation continues to 
persist. 
 
Contraction in those sectors adversely affected by competition from imports will not be counteracted by 
expansion in the more  competitive sectors. As a result, released resources are very likely to remain idle. Furthermore, 
a sluggish supply response is very likely to aggravate pressure on the balance of payment and jeopardize the 
sustainability of all efforts to liberalize trade. In fact, and since the very first attempt to liberalize trade in 1986, the 
macroeconomic environment has not been consistent with the objectives of trade liberalization.  
 
SECTION IV: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper aimed at identifying the factors that might impede efficient adjustment to trade liberalization for 
the Egyptian economy. In general,  an economic environment hampered by market failures  and plagued by inefficient 
institutions  reduces the degree of dynamism in the economy and thus certainly  raises  concerns about the costs of 
adjustment to trade liberalization.  It is important to recognize – at this stage - that most of the problems discussed in 
this paper have been also discussed elsewhere and were in general considered among the main factors responsible for   
the sluggish response of the Egyptian economy to  reform. What this paper has served to highlight is that these 
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problems are likely to contribute to high adjustment costs and  thus jeopardize the sustainability of reform efforts. 
However,  the correct policy response is not  to abandon liberalization all together but to carefully plan  the correct 
timing and choose the path of tariff liberalization along with the set of adjustment policies that  minimizes  the 
magnitude of any adjustment costs. 
 
In particular, reform on both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level is needed.  In this regard, 
removing the institutional sources of market imperfections in the labor market like minimum wage legislation is 
necessary.   Stringent hiring and firing procedures must be simplified. The bankruptcy law   must be modified along 
the lines of laws prevalent in developed countries so as to facilitate exit. Capitalization requirement has to be reduced  
to encourage entry by small scale enterprises.  In the mean time, competition law must be put in place. One way to 
deal with imperfections in the capital market arising due to collateral requirements is through the government 
providing credit guarantees to firms that cannot tap capital markets. 
 
The most important macroeconomic area of reform is exchange rate policy. Egypt should adopt a flexible 
exchange rate system so that the exchange rate reflects the true scarcity of foreign currency. Any devaluation 
occurring will automatically help relieve pressure on the balance of payment by making imports expensive and 
exports cheaper. This will makeup for any reduction in tariffs following liberalization and will consequently provide 
the necessary protection for efficient import substituting industries. At the same time, this policy will enhance 
expansion in the export sector.  Nevertheless, to prevent  any overvaluation of the currency due to capital inflows, the 
Central Bank should interfere by buying dollars when necessary.   
 
It remains to discuss the relevance of Egypt‟s reform experience to other developing countries.   What is so 
evident about this experience is the absence of a  comprehensive vision for reform.  For example Egypt  launched 
institutional reform  a decade and a half after adopting the World Bank and IMF structural adjustment and 
stabilization package in 1991 and only when its negative repercussions on growth and resource allocation became 
hard to ignore.  Passing new laws is not, however, the end of the story. Resistance by those who benefited from vague 
and complicated laws – the civil servants or the implementers in general- through side payments and bribes have 
proved to be strong. In fact, reform of the civil service should have accompanied and perhaps preceded institutional 
reform.  So far it is not clear how the government intends to deal with this problem. To conclude, the overriding  
impression of Egypt‟s experience is that reform on many fronts came late, was incomplete and slow. This breeds an 
economic environment that is likely to give rise to high adjustment costs to trade liberalization.      
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